condition that Lament's hypothesis imposes on the relationship between total cash flow and investment by the entire firm. Then, I presentdatashowing that a majority of the firms in his sample fail this basic condition. I proceed with other indicators demonstratingfew firms in this sample could have been financially constrained, aswell assome other weaknessesof the study, before concluding.
I.
Cash flow and investment.
Lament's argument is asfollows: diversified firms subsidize the investmentof nonoil units with cash flow generatedby other segmentsthrough the "internal capital market". They do so becausecredit market imperfections drive a wedge between the cost of internal funds and externalfunds. As a result,the different corporate segmentsare financially interdependent,so that financial shocks to one segmentimpact the cost of funds in other segments.
According to this argument,when oil prices fell in 1986,the decline in cash flow generatedfrom the oil segmentsof this group of firms was so sharpthat they had to curtail capital spending. Faced with the need to balance their cash inflows and expenditures, companies stopped subsidizing nonoil units and cut capital expendituresacrossthe board, including investment by nonoil segments.
Before turning to the investmentbehavior of nonoil units, it is worthwhile verifying if cash flow constraints did bind for the firm (asopposed to industry segmentswithin the firm).l
The overall firm is the appropriateunit of analysis,as internal capital marketsoperate by linking sources and uses of cash within the entire firm. Suppose there is a desired investment level 1',, determined by the net presentvalue of the expected future cash flows of the firm's investment opportunities. The firm may face credit market imperfections like those described by Lament. Actual investment,1,,is given bỹ = min{I*,, CF,}
-..
where CF~is cash flow in period t. There are two periods (1985 and 1986) ;the constraint may 2 bind in either or both periods, or not at all. Next consider the change in investment, dI,, between the two periods. There are four possible outcomes:
A. Constraint binds in both periods. 1(.l= CF,l < 1*,1,and I, = CF, < I*,. In this case,the change in investment equalsthe change in cash flow:
B. Constraint binds at t-1 only. 1,-1= cFtl < I"t-l, and CF, > It = I'to Thus, the change in investment is lessthan the change in cash flow:
c.
by less Constraint binds than cash flow:
at t only. CF,.l > 1,.l= 1',.l, and 1,= CF1 < I*,. Investment falls
D. Constraint never binds. CF,.l >~.l = 1',.l,CF, >1, = I*,. In this instancethe sign of the relationship between the change in investmentand the change in cash flow is indeterminate. Twelve firms cut investment by less than the fall in cash flow. These decreases would be consistent with constrained behavior; however, given that more than half the sample evidently cut capital spending in responseto a drop in desired investment, we cannot rule out the possibility thatthese other firms were merely reactingto less profitable investmentprojects aswell.
This comparison assumesthat other sources and usesof funds are constant. However, examining the impact of other activitieswe find that,far from causing any constraint, they on net provided additional funds for most firms in this sample. For the firms in the final group, whose investmentfell by lessthan the change in cash flow--that is, consistent with the hypothesis of binding cash constraintsin 1986-most had increasesin funds from other sources, some of them substantial. The largestcatego~of other sources of funds is from increasesin long-term debt. As will be discussedbelow, many of thesefirms had heavy bond issuancein 1986. Overall, dataon other sources and uses of funds do not suggestthat financial constraintstightened in 1986.
One could arguethat it is not just cash flow that matters,but cash stocks as well.
However, considering cash stocks for this set of firms in 1986arguesagainstthe existence of financial constraints. For example, a firm that decreasedits cash holdings would have had additional resourcesto spend on investmentin 1986,further loosening any constraints. On the other hand, an increasein cash stocks would provide evidence that the firm was not short on cash, especially considering (asis discussedbelow) that most of these firms had relatively large cash holdings compared to firms of similar size and industry.
II.
Other possible indicators of financially constrained firms.
Of course, one should not look at investmentand cash flow in isolation. Do other characteristicsof this group of firms suggestthey were financially constrained in 1986? No.
In fact, a number of other measuressuggestthat thesefirms were cash rich:
q High cash holdings relative to industry norms. Holdings of cash and liquid securitieson these firms' balance sheetsin 1986 rose by more than 25 percent, to $31.5 billion--a cash hoard for this group exceeded during the entire 1982-1994period only once, by the $31.9 billion holdings in 1987 (Table 3) . Over this span of time, in only , ,, two years did cash and securitiesholdings for the group exceed 80 percent of total capitalexpenditures: 1986, 124 percent, and 1987, 113 percent. Most firms' cash holdings were above the median for similar firms,3 and 10 were in the top quartile of .-. comparable firms; only three firms were in the bottom quartile (Table 4) . Most of these firms had ample resources to maintaininvestmentplans in smaller subsidiaries.
q Increases in common dividends paid. Firms with cash resourcesexceeding their investment opportunities may return some cash to shareholdersthrough higher dividends. In 1985, before the sharp drop in oil revenues,the averagecommon dividends paid by the firms in this group rose by $9 million~able 5). If these firms became constrained in 1986 one might expect smallerincreasesin dividends. However, the 1986 increasewas more than three times as large asin 1985, averaging$30 million. Moreover, firms continued to raisedividends in subsequentyears. Total dividends paid by the group soared by 30 percent over the next few years, from $8.2 billion in 1985to $10.7 billion in 1988. The oil shock of 1986 seemsto have had little long-term impact on the financial resources of thesefirms. q Stock repurchases. Firms that are short on cash might be expected to avoid any discretionary uses of funds like buying back sharesof common stock. However, more than half the firms in this sample had sufficient funds to carry out share repurchasesin 1986 (Table 6 ). Four firms that had not repurchasedsharesin 1985 did so in 1986, including a buyback of nearly $600 million by W R Grace. Another ten firms repurchasedsharesin both years. While repurchaseamounts in 1986 were smallerfor most firms (but not all-Schlumbergerand Union Pacific steppedup their repurchases), four of these firms had repurchasesin excessof a quarterof a billion dollars in 1986. q New debt issues in 1986. Did low collateralvalue make it difficult for firms to borrow in 1986?4 Evidently not-12 firms in this sample issuedpublic debt in 1986, and many made more than one offering (Table 7) .5 Total proceeds of these issues exceeded $8 billion. Of course, not all of this money representsnew debt, but rather refinancing of existing issues. However, firms with multi-billion dollar cash stockpiles might easily have scaleddown the size of the bond offerings if agency COSK of borrowing were a major impediment. Many, in fact, increaseddebt during 1986. q Early retirement of debt. In yet another display of the complete lack of financial constraintsfaced by these firms, on September9, 1986,Phillips Petroleum retired an entire issueof $200 million of guaranteednotes that were not due until 1989. Table 8 summarizesthe datafrom the previous sections. A "V" in columns 1-3 indicatesthat the firm violates testsof being financially constraine,d,,either due to the relationship between cash flow and investment,by increasingdividend payout or by repurchasingshares,respectively. Column 4 liststhe quartile of the ratio of cash plus securitiesto total assetsrelativeto a group of COMPUSTAT firms of comparable size, 3-digit SIC industry, and bond ratings(including 259 firms with publicly-rated debt and 1291firms without rateddebt). I do not redisplay dataon bond issueshere.
Most firms fail one or more tests;DuPont fails all three (and issuedover half a billion dollars of bonds in 1986), and has a ratio of cash holdings to assetsnear that of the median firm. Only three firms meet all the restrictions: Chevron, Fina and Zapata. Chevron, however, held liquid assetsequal to 9 percent of total assets,almost three times the median sharefor comparable firms, and raisednearly $1 billion in the bond market during 1986. One can safely rule out financial constraintsas a factor for Chevron.
Zapata Corp, on the other hand, was clearly financially constrained in 1986. Having just defaultedon two of its subordinated debt issues,it was operating under an agreement negotiatedwith its bank lenders while it pursued stepsto restructureits debt. The direct influence these lenders had on investment decisions likely contributed to the 10.3 percent decreasein investment relativeto salesby its nonoil segment,the second largestpercentage drop in this sample. Moreover, Zapata was able to obtain a new loan to finance the completion of the company's Wisdom gasfield, subject to liens placed on the project by the bank. That is, even firms in default maybe able to finance desirableprojects.
Fina also was experiencing difficulties in 1986. Its cash flow and liquid assetsboth plummeted in that year. Furthermore, while Fina paid $25 million in common dividends in 1985,it eliminated its dividend in 1986. Curiously, the change in investment relativeto sales by its chemical segmentwas -0.95 percent-the median for the segmentslisted in Larnont's Table III , and lessthan the averagecut of -1.46 percent. That is, in spite of severe constraints ,onFina, the investment behavior of its nonoil unit was fairly typical compared to the firms that were not constrained. It is important to underscore that the datado not point to pervasivedistortions in financing and investment decisions of major corporations, as Lament asserts. Rather, these firms were easily able to cushion any deterioration of oil cash flow with other resources.
III.
Other pitfalls of the paper. 
1.
This analysis financial constraint.
Notes assumes,as did Lament, that cash flow is the appropriate measureof However, broader measuresof sources and usesof funds also support the argument made in this paper, that financial constraintsdid not pinch for most firms in this sample in 1986. Furthermore, most of these firms had ample stocks of cash and securitiesto maintain investment expendituresand weather a shortfall in cash flow, and many actually added to their stock of liquid financial assetsin 1986.
2.
Total sources of funds exceeded total uses of funds for 14 of the 26 firms in the sample, up from 10 firms in 1985,prior to the sharp drop in oil prices.
3.
Relative to a control group comprised of COMPUSTAT firms of comparable size, 3-digit SIC industry, and bond ratings (including 259 firms with publicly-rated debt and 1291 firms without rateddebt).
4.
Lament states: "the value of the petroleum-relatedcollateral owned by the company also fell, so external finance may have been more difficult to obtain" (p. 86).
5.
At leastone other firm issuedprivate placements in 1986.
6. Note that this is not the measurethat would be suggestedby economic theory; rather, the expected NPV of cash flows (or Tobin's q) drives investment. However, cash flow or pretax income is the measurethat Lament has chosen, so I have presentedthis as an industv comparison. 
